求助英语高手帮忙翻译一篇关于国际经贸的短文，英译汉。机械翻译的不要复制过来

Question

This suggests that the norms are probably not customary law, since states would not be expected to enter into treaties if they thought an existing law already applied.
The OECD harmful tax practices guidance thus seems to fall short of international law in the formal sense of treaty or custom. Yet states feel compelled to adhere to the recommendations and guidelines, perhaps not least because there are—at least potentially—real consequences for failure to comply.
If the OECD initiative is not law, it nevertheless creates a strong degree of obligation among member and non-member states alike. This sense of obligation makes it difficult to simply dismiss the guidance as “not law.”
To resolve this problem, we may again consult the international law literature, which suggests that the distinction between something that is or is not hard law may not be binary but may present a spectrum or continuum based on theories about obligation and its attendant features.
Some international law scholars use the term soft law to describe some norms that may not themselves constitute law but seem to have effects that evoke a legal process or form. The international law literature frames soft law as norms that are not thought of as law per se but compel a law-like sense of obligation in states. If a soft to hard law continuum exists, it seems to be characterized by a sense that the less we are inclined to equate a practice or pronouncement with a legal obligation, the more a label like soft law seems appropriate.
The category of soft law thus seems to offer a third way between the potentially uncomfortable position of describing the OECD guidance as “law” and therefore implying states must comply with it, and the potentially unrealistic position of describing it as not law at all, despite evidence that countries do in fact comply with it, often against their self-interest or will (or both). But describing OECD guidance as soft law does not simplify the analysis of how international tax law develops. Instead, the description opens up an important inquiry regarding who is involved in shaping tax norms.

As a few tax scholars have noted, describing something as law, whether hard or soft, creates expectations about how countries may behave.
确切点说是有关国际贸易法的英语文章。

Answer 1

这表明，可能是不规范的习惯法，因为国家没有将缔结条约，如果他们认为现有的法律已经实施。
经合组织有害的税收做法的指导从而似乎是属于在正式的条约或习惯国际法意义上的短。然而，国家感到有必要坚持的建议和指导方针，也许不仅仅是因为有，至少是潜在??at，??real对不遵守的后果。
如果经合组织倡议不是法律，但它创造了在成员国和非成员国的义务强烈程度的一致好评。这种义务感，难以轻易否定作为，?únot法律指导。坳
要解决这个问题，我们可能会再次征询国际法律文献，这表明介于两者之间的区别，是或不是硬法律，但未必是二进制可能存在连续谱或基于对obligation理论和随之而来的特点。
一些国际法学者使用这个词来形容一些软法规范，可能本身并不构成法律，但似乎效果，引起了法律的过程或形式。国际法律文献帧因为这是没有想到的是法律本身，而是迫使义务如同法律规范意义上的国家软法律。如果软到硬法律的连续性存在，它似乎是由一种感觉，我们倾向于少等同于法律义务的做法，或宣告了，多像软法律标签似乎是恰当的特点。
软法的范畴从而似乎提供之间的描述为，?úlaw，非盟的经合组织指导，因此这意味着各国必须遵守它，而不是法律，它描述为在所有可能不切实际的位置可能不舒服的位置三分之一的方式，尽管有证据表明国家都遵守它在事实上，对自身的利益往往还是会（或两者）。但描述经合组织软法律指南不简化了国际税法的发展分析。相反，说明调查开辟了一个重要的方面是谁在塑造税收规范有关。

由于一些税务学者所指出的，描述为法律的事，无论硬或软，造成有关国家如何可能行为的期望。

Answer 2

这表明有可能不规范的习惯法,因为国家是不会进入条约如果他们认为现行的法律已经用。
经合组织有害税收实践指导因此似乎到不了国际法律的形式感条约或习俗。然而州感到不得不坚持建议和指导方针,也许不仅仅因为are-at至少有potentially-real未能履行后果。
如果经合组织主动不是法律,它不过制造出强烈的程度的义务在成员国和非成员国相似。这个意义上的义务很难简单地把这个指导“不是法律。”
来解决这一问题,我们又可以咨询国际法文学,这表明之间的区别是或不是的东西努力法规不得二进制但可以提出光谱或连续介质理论基础上的义务,并对相关的特征。
一些国际法律学者使用术语“软法来描述一些规范,不得本身便构成规律但似乎有影响,塑造了一个法律程序或形式。国际法律文献帧作为软法规范,不认为是法律本身但强迫一个law-like义务意识状态。如果一个软到硬法律连续存在,它似乎,其特征是一种感觉,我们愈少倾向于把练习或声明,有法定义务,更一个标签像软法看来是合适的。
如此软法”的范畴,似乎有三分之一的潜在的舒服的姿势在经济合作与发展组织指导进行描述的“法”,因此,必须符合国家暗示,以及可能产生的不切实际的位置不律,并称其为证据表明,尽管事实上符合国家,这通常对他们自身的利益或(或两者)。但描述经济合作与发展组织指导软法不简化分析国际税法学的发展。相反,描述打开一个重要的询问关于涉及到谁在塑造税务规范。