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Question

C. A Blueprint for Regulatory Reform
Its arguably undue confidence in concession contracts aside, Regulating Infrastructure does sketch a useful blueprint for regulatory reform. My own regrettably compressed survey of American regulatory policy suggests that Professor Gomez-Ibanez's tripartite division between private contracts, concession contracts, and discretionary regulation closely tracks existing distinctions within the law of regulated industries. Constructive legal critique begins with careful examination of the weaknesses in each of those strategies; successful, enduring reform demands not only that government avoid regulatory mismatches, but also that government affirmatively match the proper legal tools with regulatory goals. n223
Professor Gomez-Ibanez's private contract model best fits transportation industries. For decades we have known that the operation of transportation systems such as airlines and trucking fleets, as distinct from the construction of transportation platforms, demands relatively modest investment in durable, immobile inputs. As a result, the complete abolition of common carriage, filed tariffs, and even entire regulatory agencies has delivered substantial gains in consumer welfare. Commercial airlines, railroads, and interstate trucking companies were deregulated in all but name by the early 1980s. With minor exceptions, such as the Surface Transportation Board's residual power to approve mergers and to review rates paid by captive shippers whenever such rates exceed 180% of the relevant railroad's variable costs, n224 potentially anticompetitive behavior within American transportation markets is patrolled mostly by antitrust. The slow displacement of common carriage and filed tariffs by contract carriage and negotiated rates has entrusted most legal aspects [*1651] of major transportation industries to private contracts. In almost every respect, airline operations today are governed by contracts between carriers and passengers, right down to frequent flier programs. n225
What this deregulatory model has not produced, and never could have been expected to produce, is a proliferation of numerous, smaller firms in these industries. Deregulation of transportation did not set a goal of perfect competition, but rather perfect contestability. The theory of contestable markets accommodates oligopolistic industrial structure as long as individual firms can freely enter and exit the market with no sunk costs. n226 "Given the character of modern technology," contestability provides "a standard of structure and performance that is more pertinent than pure competition.

Answer 1

三蓝图规制改革
它可以说是不必要的信心，在特许权合同外，规范基础设施，确是素描一个有用的蓝图，改革规管架构。我自己的遗憾压缩统计调查结果显示，美国的监管政策，建议教授戈麦斯的三方分工私人之间的合同，特许权合同，并酌情调节密切追踪现有的区别，可以按照法律规范的行业。建设性法律批判开始认真的检查薄弱环节，每一项战略;成功，长久的改革要求，不仅如此，政府的监管，避免错配，但也表示，政府肯定配合适当的法律工具，各项监管目标。 n223
教授戈麦斯的私人承包模式最适合运输工业。几十年来，我们已经知道，这次行动的运输系统，如航空公司和货运船队，有别于施工运输平台，需求相对较小的投资，耐用，不动的投入。因此，完全废除共同运输，存档关税，甚至整个监管机构已发表了实质性进展，消费者的福利。商业航空公司，铁路运输和州际货运公司放开所有，但名称由80年代初。除了少数例外，如地面运输委员会的剩余权力，以批准的兼并，并检讨利率支付的圈养付货时，这些利率超过180 ％的有关铁路的可变成本， n224潜在的反竞争行为，美国运输市场巡逻大多由反托拉斯法。缓慢位移的共同运输和归档关税，运输合同，并商定利率已委托大多数法律方面[ * 1651 ]主要运输行业，以私人合约。几乎在每一个方面，航空公司经营，今天是由合约之间的承运人和旅客，以低至频繁传单节目。日经指数
这放宽监管模式已不生产，决不可被预期将产生，是一个扩散众多，规模较小的公司，在这些行业中。放宽对运输没有确定的目标，完善的竞争，而是完善的.理论有争议市场容纳寡头垄断的产业结构，只要个别企业可以自由地进入和退出市场，没有沉淀成本。 n226 ： "由于性格的现代技术， " 提供了"一个标准的结构和性能是较为中肯的，比单纯的竞争。